Boyoon Chang, Sung Jin Kang, and Tae Yong Jung
Sustainability 2019, 11(6), 1786; https://doi.org/10.3390/su11061786
The price and output elasticities of energy demand continue to be of interest to academia and policy institutions, having been estimated in previous studies. However, the estimated results show some inconsistencies, especially at the sectoral level, across countries. Based on our conjecture that those inconsistencies are mainly due to the effect of contingent energy intensities and partially to different units of analysis, we narrowed the analysis to the industry level and classified 16 industries into energy-intensive and less energy-intensive groups. The effects of price and output on energy demand were then compared between these two groups using 274 industry panel data across 20 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries from 1978 to 2013. The results showed that the price elasticity of energy demand was consistently lower in the energy-intensive group than in the less energy-intensive group, whereas the output elasticity of energy demand was higher in the energy-intensive group than in the less energy-intensive group. Using panel differences and system generalized method of moments estimations, the dynamic elasticities of energy demand were also estimated. Energy demand in reaction to both price and output changes appeared to be more elastic in the long term than in the short term for both energy-intensive and less energy-intensive groups. These findings could be a useful reference for policy makers to deploy separate energy policies for different industries aiming for different temporal effects.
Boyoon Chang
In the rapidly evolving digital landscape, where businesses are interconnected and market boundaries are increasingly blurred, Big Tech companies face complex competition dynamics. With more digital markets dominated by either two or more of these companies, it is important to understand whether their decisions are affected by the other and, if so, how much. What are the dynamics between them that result in their strategic decisions? Addressing these questions can help define the relevant market, which has been a particularly important issue in strategy and competition economics literature. This paper examines the acquisition records of the ``big five'' -- Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Meta and Apple -- between 2004 and 2021. We identify two distinct behavioral patterns, which we call strategic persistence (extension of their past strategic decision) and strategic convergence (conforming their decision with the other four). Using an acquisition game model that accounts for the dynamic interplay among these companies, we show varying degrees of firm convergent and persistent behaviors. This finding highlights two interconnected insights: first, each individual Big Tech company pursues a unique strategic positioning; second, the converging tendency shown across these companies underscores the intense competitive pressures they face as close rivals.
Boyoon Chang and Keaton Miller
Mobile app platforms are highly concentrated – Apple and Google each distribute over 75% of the total number of apps installed on the relevant devices. These platforms generally require developers to use a built-in system for processing payments with a commission rate of 30% for both the initial purchase of an app and any subsequent in-app purchases. In September 2021, South Korea became the first country to ban this lock-in; purchases made in the country may be conducted through any billing system developers wish. We analyze the impact of this policy change (and Apple’s subsequent adaptation) on demand for apps and revenue using difference-in-differences techniques and data on apps offered through Apple’s App Store from a leading app analytics firm from January 2018 to December 2023. We find no evidence that the policy change generated substantive changes in South Korea’s app marketplace.
[1] Commission Rate and Platform Competition
[2] Strategic Portfolio Optimization: Balancing Economies of Scope and Economies of Scale in Acquisitions