• EC 360: Issues in IO
  • Preface
  • Lecture 1
    • What is Industrial Organization?
    • In this class
    • Market Power
      • Example 1
      • Example 2
    • Why do we care?
    • How does it happen?
      • Predatory Pricing
      • High startup costs
      • Legal Protection
    • The Firm and Profit Maximization
      • What is a firm?
      • Profit Maximization
      • Common Assumptions
    • Profit Maximization
      • Intuition
      • Price-taking firms
      • Proit Maximization
      • Solving profit max problem algebraically
    • Threats to profit maximization
  • Lecture 2
    • In previous class…
    • What is a model?
    • Perfect competition
      • What do we mean by perfect competition?
    • Market Equilibrium
      • Reaching market equilibrium: example 1
      • Reaching market equilibrium: example 2
      • Are perfectly competitive markets realistic?
      • Are perfectly competitive markets socially optimal?
    • Time horizon: short run and long run
    • What is a monopoly
    • Are monopolies realistic?
    • How do monopolies happen?
    • Monopolist’s profit maximization
      • Simple example
      • Another example with implications
    • Social Cost of Monopolization
    • How to eliminate deadweight loss
    • Issues with regulation
    • Innovations and Monopolies
    • Dominant Firm
      • Model Assumptions
      • Results
      • Examples of markets where a dominant firm (fringe) model is appropriate
      • Solving the dominant firm model
    • Reference
  • Lecture 3
    • Antitrust
      • Antitrust background: Pre-Civil War
      • Antitrust background: Post-Civil War
      • Antitrust background: Cartels
      • Antitrust background: Cartel cheating
      • Antitrust background: Trusts
    • Sherman Antitrust Act
      • Issues with the Sherman Act
      • Penalties and Sanctions
      • Sanctions Example
      • Legislative Intent of the Sherman Act
      • Bork Interpretation
      • Lande Interpretation
      • Consequences of Varying Interpretations
      • Early Enforcement
    • The Clayton Act
      • Price Discrimination
      • Exclusionary Practices
      • Mergers
    • Federal Trade Commission Act
    • Public Enforcement
      • Department of Justice
      • DOJ Success
      • DOJ Antitrust Division
      • Criminal Case Stats
    • Exemptions
      • Labor
      • Labor but not firms
      • Agricultural Co-ops
      • Regulated Industries
      • Patents
    • Reference
  • Lecture 4
    • Private Antitrust Enforcement
      • Private Enforcement History
    • Antitrust Standing
      • Who is a person?
      • What constitutes a business or property?
      • What is antitrust injury?
      • Returning to the lysine example…
      • Apple Inc. v. Pepper et al. (2019)
      • The cost-plus contract exception
      • In pari delicto
    • Damages
      • Measuring Damages
      • Proving Antitrust Damages
      • “But for” damage estimation
      • “But for” damage estimation: graphical explanation
      • Net Harm
      • Methodologies
      • Flaws with damage estimation methodologies
      • Joint Liability
    • Class Action and Parens Patriae
      • Class action suits
      • Parens Patriae Suits
    • Attorney’s Fees
    • Settlements
      • Instruments of Discovery
  • Lecture 5
    • Market Definition
      • Questions
    • DOJ and FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines
      • Geographic Space: Demand-Side
      • Geographic Space: Supply-Side
      • Evidence of Geographic Markets
      • Product Space: Demand-Side
      • Product Space: Supply-Side
      • Evidence of Product Markets
      • The Law of One Price
    • Modern Evidence of Markets
    • Market Power
      • Measuring market power: the Lerner index
      • Lerner Index: Dominant Firm Extension
    • Market Power and Market Definition
    • Market Power in Practice
      • Excess Profit
    • Entry Barriers
    • Some practice problems
    • Market definition in practice
  • Lecture 6
    • Section 2 of the Sherman Act
      • Natural monopoly
    • Related court cases
      • Standard Oil Company v. US (1911)
      • US v. American Tobacco Company (1911)
      • US v. US Steel (1920)
      • US v. Aluminum Company of America (1945)
      • US v. Griffith (1948)
    • Grinnell test
      • Aspen Skiing Company v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corporation (1985)
      • Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. (1992)
    • US v. Microsoft (2001)
      • Case summary
      • Industry background
      • Conflicting view of competition
      • Microsoft’s expert economist
      • Elements of market power
      • Barriers to entry
      • Exclusionary conduct
      • Judicial decision
    • Attempts and conspiracies
      • Attempts to monopolize
      • Specific intent
      • Conspiracies to monopolize
      • Consipracies to monopolize: dangerous probabilities
    • Injury and damages
  • Lecture 7
    • Sherman Act: Exclusionary Practices
    • Predatory pricing
      • Conditions to rationalize predatory pricing
      • Empirical evidence of predatory pricing
      • Areeda Turner rule
    • Relevant Court cases
      • Barry Write Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp (1983)
      • Masushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (1986)
      • Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (1993)
    • Recoupmment
      • Example
    • Bundling
      • Anticompetitive Bundling Example
  • Lecture 8
    • Clayton Act: Price Discrimination
    • Types of Price Discrimination
      • First-degree price discrimination (perfect price discrimination)
      • Second-degree price discrimination
      • Third-degree price discrimination
      • Solving for Optimal Production
    • Conditions for Success
    • Robinson-Patman Act of 1936
    • Primary-Line Injury
      • Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co. (1967)
    • Secondary-Line Injury
      • FTC v. Morton Salt Co. (1948)
    • Indirect Price Discrimination
    • Unequal Cost Defense
      • Scale cost differences
      • Robinson-Patman treatment of big buyers
  • Lecture 9
    • Cartel Theory
      • Perfect Competition
      • Mutliplant Monopoly
      • Cartel Theory
    • Cartel Problems
      • Entry Problems
      • Cartel Cheating
      • Unequal Costs
    • Court Cases
      • United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc. (1897)
      • United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. (1927)
      • United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. (1940)
    • Market Division
      • Threats to Market Division
      • Enforcement
    • Oligopolies and Tacit Collusion
      • Oligopoly
      • Nash Equilibrium
      • Example
      • Example Question
  • Lecture 10
    • Cournot model
      • Example
      • Another Example
    • Chamberlain model
      • Example
      • Problems
    • Practices leading to tacit collusion
      • Price visibility
      • Price preannouncement
      • Precommitments
      • Price leadership
      • Dominant firm price leadership
      • Low cost price leadership
      • Barometric price leadership
      • Collusive price leadership
    • Antitrust enforcement dilemma
    • Court cases
      • Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States (1939)
      • E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC (1984)
      • US v. International Harvesters Co. et al (1927)
      • Kleen Products LLC. Georgia Pacific LLC (2018)
  • Published with bookdown

EC 360: Issues in Industrial Organization

Reference

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-3049/pdf/COMPS-3049.pdf