• EC 360: Issues in IO
  • Preface
  • Lecture 1
    • What is Industrial Organization?
    • In this class
    • Market Power
      • Example 1
      • Example 2
    • Why do we care?
    • How does it happen?
      • Predatory Pricing
      • High startup costs
      • Legal Protection
    • The Firm and Profit Maximization
      • What is a firm?
      • Profit Maximization
      • Common Assumptions
    • Profit Maximization
      • Intuition
      • Price-taking firms
      • Proit Maximization
      • Solving profit max problem algebraically
    • Threats to profit maximization
  • Lecture 2
    • In previous class…
    • What is a model?
    • Perfect competition
      • What do we mean by perfect competition?
    • Market Equilibrium
      • Reaching market equilibrium: example 1
      • Reaching market equilibrium: example 2
      • Are perfectly competitive markets realistic?
      • Are perfectly competitive markets socially optimal?
    • Time horizon: short run and long run
    • What is a monopoly
    • Are monopolies realistic?
    • How do monopolies happen?
    • Monopolist’s profit maximization
      • Simple example
      • Another example with implications
    • Social Cost of Monopolization
    • How to eliminate deadweight loss
    • Issues with regulation
    • Innovations and Monopolies
    • Dominant Firm
      • Model Assumptions
      • Results
      • Examples of markets where a dominant firm (fringe) model is appropriate
      • Solving the dominant firm model
    • Reference
  • Lecture 3
    • Antitrust
      • Antitrust background: Pre-Civil War
      • Antitrust background: Post-Civil War
      • Antitrust background: Cartels
      • Antitrust background: Cartel cheating
      • Antitrust background: Trusts
    • Sherman Antitrust Act
      • Issues with the Sherman Act
      • Penalties and Sanctions
      • Sanctions Example
      • Legislative Intent of the Sherman Act
      • Bork Interpretation
      • Lande Interpretation
      • Consequences of Varying Interpretations
      • Early Enforcement
    • The Clayton Act
      • Price Discrimination
      • Exclusionary Practices
      • Mergers
    • Federal Trade Commission Act
    • Public Enforcement
      • Department of Justice
      • DOJ Success
      • DOJ Antitrust Division
      • Criminal Case Stats
    • Exemptions
      • Labor
      • Labor but not firms
      • Agricultural Co-ops
      • Regulated Industries
      • Patents
    • Reference
  • Lecture 4
    • Private Antitrust Enforcement
      • Private Enforcement History
    • Antitrust Standing
      • Who is a person?
      • What constitutes a business or property?
      • What is antitrust injury?
      • Returning to the lysine example…
      • Apple Inc. v. Pepper et al. (2019)
      • The cost-plus contract exception
      • In pari delicto
    • Damages
      • Measuring Damages
      • Proving Antitrust Damages
      • “But for” damage estimation
      • “But for” damage estimation: graphical explanation
      • Net Harm
      • Methodologies
      • Flaws with damage estimation methodologies
      • Joint Liability
    • Class Action and Parens Patriae
      • Class action suits
      • Parens Patriae Suits
    • Attorney’s Fees
    • Settlements
      • Instruments of Discovery
  • Lecture 5
    • Market Definition
      • Questions
    • DOJ and FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines
      • Geographic Space: Demand-Side
      • Geographic Space: Supply-Side
      • Evidence of Geographic Markets
      • Product Space: Demand-Side
      • Product Space: Supply-Side
      • Evidence of Product Markets
      • The Law of One Price
    • Modern Evidence of Markets
    • Market Power
      • Measuring market power: the Lerner index
      • Lerner Index: Dominant Firm Extension
    • Market Power and Market Definition
    • Market Power in Practice
      • Excess Profit
    • Entry Barriers
    • Some practice problems
    • Market definition in practice
  • Lecture 6
    • Section 2 of the Sherman Act
      • Natural monopoly
    • Related court cases
      • Standard Oil Company v. US (1911)
      • US v. American Tobacco Company (1911)
      • US v. US Steel (1920)
      • US v. Aluminum Company of America (1945)
      • US v. Griffith (1948)
    • Grinnell test
      • Aspen Skiing Company v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corporation (1985)
      • Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. (1992)
    • US v. Microsoft (2001)
      • Case summary
      • Industry background
      • Conflicting view of competition
      • Microsoft’s expert economist
      • Elements of market power
      • Barriers to entry
      • Exclusionary conduct
      • Judicial decision
    • Attempts and conspiracies
      • Attempts to monopolize
      • Specific intent
      • Conspiracies to monopolize
      • Consipracies to monopolize: dangerous probabilities
    • Injury and damages
  • Lecture 7
    • Sherman Act: Exclusionary Practices
    • Predatory pricing
      • Conditions to rationalize predatory pricing
      • Empirical evidence of predatory pricing
      • Areeda Turner rule
    • Relevant Court cases
      • Barry Write Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp (1983)
      • Masushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (1986)
      • Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (1993)
    • Recoupmment
      • Example
    • Bundling
      • Anticompetitive Bundling Example
  • Lecture 8
    • Clayton Act: Price Discrimination
    • Types of Price Discrimination
      • First-degree price discrimination (perfect price discrimination)
      • Second-degree price discrimination
      • Third-degree price discrimination
      • Solving for Optimal Production
    • Conditions for Success
    • Robinson-Patman Act of 1936
    • Primary-Line Injury
      • Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co. (1967)
    • Secondary-Line Injury
      • FTC v. Morton Salt Co. (1948)
    • Indirect Price Discrimination
    • Unequal Cost Defense
      • Scale cost differences
      • Robinson-Patman treatment of big buyers
  • Lecture 9
    • Cartel Theory
      • Perfect Competition
      • Mutliplant Monopoly
      • Cartel Theory
    • Cartel Problems
      • Entry Problems
      • Cartel Cheating
      • Unequal Costs
    • Court Cases
      • United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc. (1897)
      • United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. (1927)
      • United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. (1940)
    • Market Division
      • Threats to Market Division
      • Enforcement
    • Oligopolies and Tacit Collusion
      • Oligopoly
      • Nash Equilibrium
      • Example
      • Example Question
  • Lecture 10
    • Cournot model
      • Example
      • Another Example
    • Chamberlain model
      • Example
      • Problems
    • Practices leading to tacit collusion
      • Price visibility
      • Price preannouncement
      • Precommitments
      • Price leadership
      • Dominant firm price leadership
      • Low cost price leadership
      • Barometric price leadership
      • Collusive price leadership
    • Antitrust enforcement dilemma
    • Court cases
      • Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States (1939)
      • E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC (1984)
      • US v. International Harvesters Co. et al (1927)
      • Kleen Products LLC. Georgia Pacific LLC (2018)
  • Published with bookdown

EC 360: Issues in Industrial Organization

Related court cases

Standard Oil Company v. US (1911)

  • Conduct
    • In the 1870’s, three businesspeople conspired to create the oil company Standard oil
    • By 1872, Standard Oil acquired 35 to 40 refineries in the Cleveland area and used its buying power to extract illegal discounts from pipelines and railroads, engaged in espionage, market allocation schemes, and even set up fake competitors.
  • Decision
    • The Supreme Court found Standard Oil guilty of an antitrust violation under Section 2 of Sherman Act.
    • The Standard Oil Corporation was horizontally divested into smaller companies.
  • Rule of reason applied
    • Standard Oil’s dominant market position is not per se violation of Section 2 of Sherman Act.
    • Standard Oil wasn’t guilty merely because it was a monopoly, but rather how they became a monopoly
    • Examined whether Standard Oil’s dominant market power is a result of superior efficiency (performance) or abusive business practices
  • Established abuse theory of monopoly
    • Only a monopoly who gained its power through abuse means (i.e. predatory pricing, forcing out competitors, etc.) was guilty of antitrust violation (purpose and intent to monopolize should be evident)

US v. American Tobacco Company (1911)

  • Conduct
    • In 1890, five cigarette firms merged to form American Tobacco Company, accounting for 95% of the market.
    • American Tobacco was found to have engaged in several activities with the intention to monopolize the trade by driving competitors out of business
    • Initiated price wars, buying up competitors, then closing them down
  • Decision
    • The Supreme Court found American Tobacco guilty of monopolization
    • This ruling was consistent with the abuse theory of monopoly

US v. US Steel (1920)

  • Conduct
    • In 1901, US Steel formed as a combination of 180 independent steel producers, controlling 80-95% of steel production in the US
    • The 180 formerly independent steel producers (US Steel) engaged in price fixing; however, they did not engage in coercion or predatory pricing
    • Before an antitrust suit was filed, they abandoned price-fixing activities and by the time an antitrust suit was filed, their market share had fallen to roughly 40%
  • Decision
    • Supreme Court found US Steel innocent of any antitrust violation
    • The court found that US Steel did not have substantial market power, stating that “the law does not make mere size an offense, or the existence of unexerted power an offense. It … requires overt acts.”
    • Considered as a successful defense using abuse theory of monopoly

US v. Aluminum Company of America (1945)

  • Case Description
    • This case is notable for being a controversial departure from the abuse theory of monopoly
    • Through 1912, Alcoa was the dominant manufacturer of aluminum
    • They controlled the two main patents to affordably produce aluminum
    • They were known to practice market division with foreign aluminum producers and cut deals with electric companies to exclude competitors
    • In 1912, Alcoa entered a consent decree with the US government that banned any furthur use of restrictive practices
      • Consent decree is an agreement between involved parties that is approved by the court
    • From 1912 to 1940, despite of having to operate under consent decree, Alcoa was the sole producer of aluminum in the US (no patent protection, did not engage in restrictive practices)
  • Decision
    • In 1945, Alcoa was found guilty of antitrust violation
    • This case set precedent that anything other than becoming a monopoly accidentally was illegal
    • The judge decided that Alcoa’s monopoly status did not happen accidentally by its own efficiency but its persistent determination to maintain control.
    • Alcoa carefully calculated market behavior in a way to invent new uses of aluminum to create additional demand and made sure that it could fulfill those additional demand
    • The Court found a structural monopoly violates section 2 of Sherman Act unless the monoply was thrust upon the firm or was the result of superior skill

US v. Griffith (1948)

  • Conduct
    • Griffith owned movie theaters in 85 towns in the southwest, and owned the only movie theater in 53 of these towns
    • They negotiated screenings using all of their theaters, giving them tremendoes buying power with film distributors
    • This buying power often gave Griffith exclusive rights to first-run movies in towns where it faced competition
  • Decision
    • The Supreme Court found that although there was no monopolistic intent, the final result was a monopoly exerting market power, thus Griffith was guilty of an antitrust violation
    • This set precedent that intentions are not necessary to establish innocence or guilt in an antitrust case

It follows a fortiori that the use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor is unlawful.